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Abstract
An encryption scheme is proposed which allows a hierarchical organization of keys used
to encrypt and decrypt data stored in databases. The scheme uses the same method as the

RSA cryptosystem [RISH78] to encrypt and decrypt data, with additional restrictions on
the availability of the encryption infonnation to the public. Its security is based on the
Discrete Logarithm problem [DlHE76] which is known to be NPI. Each user is issued a
key which is used for decryption and user clearance verification.
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1. Introduction

Databases are designed to be shared by a number of users, and so a method is
needed to ensure that only authorized users can access data stored in the database. The
aim of this paper is to propose a scheme which allows a hierarchical organization of
encryption and decryption keys associated with the levels of security in the database
system. The scheme uses the same method as the RSA cryptosystem [RISH78] to
encrypt and decrypt data and provides security based on the difficulty of solving the
Discrete Logarithm problem [DIHE76] which is known to be NPI [GAJ079]. Each user
is issued a key which is used for decryption and used for user clearance verification.
Users having higher clearance levels can read data of lower clearance level, while users
with lower clearance levels can request data to be stored as being of higher level than the

user's clearance. In our discussion we consider three levels of security for data, the
highest level is the A-level, second is the B-Ievel, and the lowest level is the C-Ievel.
Correspondingly, there are three groups of users: the A-clearance, B-clearance and Cclearance groups. The ideas in this paper can be easily extended to more than three
security and clearance levels. This paper does not address the problem of inference
control (such as that in statistical databases) and the problem of database operations on
encrypted data.
The idea of securing databases using cryptographic methods is not new and a
considerable amount of work has been done in this area. Gudes, Koch and Stahl
[GUKO?6] has put forward methods to perfonn cryptographic transfonnations in
databases which preserves data structures. This includes the substitution, transposition,
reduction and expansion of data items. Davida [DAWE81] has proposed an encryption
scheme based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem which allows some algebraic
operations to be perfonned on the encrypted data [DA YE82]. The Chinese Remainder
Theorem is useful in that given n large primes dj, ... , d n and a particular value Ci such
that C i = aj mod dj (j = l .... n) all aj values can be retrieved from C i by simply
calculating Ci mod dj. In this way a database can be encrypted, where record i of the
database would correspond to Ci, the field values being encrypted would correpond to aj.
and the decryption keys for field} would correspond to dj. Denning [DENN83] has used
the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [DES??] to perfonn encryption and authentication at
the field level. For each data element a distinct cryptographic key is used. The keys are
constructed by combining the record and field identifiers together with a secret database
key via a key generating function. Authentication is perfonned using checksums of the
data elements and the key used to compute_ the checksums are made out of the identifiers
and the database key. Another proposition which allows operations on encrypted data is
that of privacy homomorphism put forward by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos
[RIAD78]. The idea is that instead of decrypting data before operations are perfonned, the
operations are done on the encrypted data. Specialized encryption functions Of privacy
homomorphisms are used to encrypt data and hence allows operations to be perfonned.
This presents some applications in securing databases.

2. Security requirements and assumptions
Most secure systems classify users into one of a number of security classes or
groups which corresponds to the security level attached to the data. Furthennore, in these
systems it is commonly agreed that a "write-up-read-down" rule is observed. This means
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that any user can read and write data to the database if the data is of the same security
classification as the user's security clearance. In addition, a user with lower security
clearance can only write data to a higher level security area or the same security level as
the user in the database (ie. write-up). A user with a higher security clearance can only
read data at the same security or from a lower security level (ie. read-down). This
prevents low clearance users from reading sensitive data of higher security classification,
and prevents high clearance users from giving higher clearance data to lower clearance
users.
In our discussion we assume that the database system used is an untrusted one,
one taken directly "off the shelf' without any modification. We further assume there is a

Security System or Filter (similar to [DENN84] and [GRAU84]) which behaves as an
interface between the user and the database system, and that there is to some extent a
secure operating system underlying the database. This is shown in fig. 1. All queries to
the database system pass through the security system which holds all cryptographic
information necessary to ensure security of data stored in the untrusted database. The
security system also ensures that only permitted data is passed to a user. Data items
which are classified higher in the database than the user's security clearance are filtered
out. Using the security system users can request the retrieved to be delivered either in
clear form or in an encrypted form. In the first case the security system must perform all
decryption of the retrieved data and filter out higher level data. In the later case the system
must reencrypt the filtered data and the user must decrypt user his or her key. This is
particularly useful for data which need to be transmitted over a public computer network.
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Figure 1. Security system between the user and the database system.

Other assumptions include the possibility of a Trojan Horse in the database system
which could either run on its own or run with the aid of a user. To allow operations on
encrypted data some form of field and record identifiers are used in the database, and that
they are included in the database encryption. Finally, given that the database is shared it
is necessary to store the identification of a user who performed the last update to the
database. This may be part of a log mechanism which is supported in most database
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systems. A more comprehensive discussion on the requirements and characteristics of
database encryption can be found in [DAWES!]. Readers wishing to know more on
other encryption methods are directed to [SEPI88].

3. Encryption and decryption in the RSA cryptosystem
The security of the proposed scheme is achieved by relying on the difficulty of
solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem [DlHE76]. The scheme follows the RSA
cryptosystem [RISH78] in the encryption and decryption of messages which is based on
both the Discrete Logarithm and Factorization problems. Given a message M, encryption
key Ke and decryption key Kd, M is decrypted and encrypted as follows:

encrypt:

(1)

decrypt:

(2)

where C in this case is the resulting cryptogram. Here Ke and Kd are chosen such that:
Ke. Kd

=1

(mod ¢(N) )

(3)

where N = p. q for prime p and q, and ¢(N) = Icm (p-l, q.l). ¢(N) isthe Euler Totient
function. Equation (3) is based on Euler's generalization theorem which requires:
M~(N)

=

1 (mod N), gcd(M, N) = 1

(4)

Here {em means least common multiple and gcd means greatest common divisor.
In the RSA cryptosystem N is the product of two very large primes p and q. In
the proposed scheme N does not necessarily have to be the product of only two primes,
though it is desirable that N is composed out of primes, each to the exponent of one only.
The RSA cryptosystem makes public the values of N, Ke and C, while in our scheme we
keep N, (J(N) and Ke secret. Hence the security of the proposed scheme relies only on
the Discrete Logarithm problem which is known to be NPI. As will be shown later we
issue decrypting keys to the user in the fonn of a modification to the actual decrypting key
Kd·
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4. The proposed scheme
The proposed scheme uses encryption of data in the database to prevent access by
illegal users. Each data element is encrypted and then stored in the database. and only
users with the appropriate decryption keys can decrypt any required data. The keys
issued to users are chosen in a multilevel fashion. giving a number of higher clearance
users more "powerful" keys and low clearance users "weaker" keys.

Hence. for

example. an A-clearance user will have more power than a B-clearance user and thus can
access more data than the B-clearance user. The A-clearance user can read A-level data,
while the B-clearance user can request data be stored as A-level.
Part of the proposed scheme is to find suitable keys Ke and Kd which satisfy
equation (3). One direct way to do this is to let the product of Ke and KdtO be equal to
DIN) where:

(5)

DIN) ; Ie. ¢IN)) + 1

where c is any constant greater than zero. Note that D(N) will always be equal to I
modulo ¢(N). From equation (5) we can find any two numbers whose product equals
DIN). and they can be used as Ke and Kdin equation (3). and hence equation (I) and (2).
In other words any two factors of DIN) whose product equals DIN) can be used as keys
in (3). We call keys which are taken directly from the set of divisors of DIN) parent
keys.
The scheme gets its multilevel property from the fact that given a pair of parent
keys generated using D(N) for a suitable N and c, these keys can decrypt data encrypted
using some of the other parent keys also generated from the same D(N). Let us consider
thatD(N) has the following divisors (d1, d2, dj, ... d n ) in an increasing order and that

the product of each of I dz. dn ). Id2.dn-Z). Id3. dn-2) • ...• Idk. dn-k+Z) equals DIN).
Note that these pairs are parent keys, and to each of the security levels A-level, B-Ievel
and C-Ievel we assign a pair of these divisors. If we encrypt data using dn-j and dj+1ldk
then we can decrypt using dk because dk = a. dj+1, for some integer a> 0 and positive
j < n. And thus we have
dn-j . dk

= dn-j

.

I a. dj+Z) = a I mod

¢IN))

(6)

and
(7)

where Kactual is the actual decryption key used by the security system. So for our data M,
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Mdn-j. Kactual '" Mdn-j. dj+I

(mo4 ¢(N)) '"

M ( mod N)

(8)

For example take (dI, d n ), (d2, d._I) and (d3, d n-2) . Assume that dIld3, dIld2
and d21d3 and we encrypt all A-level data using d n-2, all B-level data using dn-I and all Clevel data using dn . A-clearance users holding key d3 can not only decrypt A-level data,

but also B-Ievel and C-level data. B-clearance users can decrypt B-Ievel and C-Ievel data,

while C-cIearance users can only decrypt C-level data. C-clearance users cannot decrypt
A-level data because d3 does not divide d]. hence equation (7) will give Kactual < 1. On

seeing this the security system will deny access to the requested data

5. Example
To illustrate the discussion in the previous section, we present an example using
only small numbers. In an actual implementation it is necessary to use numbers in the
order of three hundred to four hundred digits long for N and c to ensure security,
•

First, let N = 10062, !1I(N) = 3024 and c = 26.
Then D(N) = 26.3024 +1 = 78625 ,
and D(N) has divisors:

5,17,25,37,85,125,185,425,629,925,2125,3145,4625,15725
or in paiIwise order:
(5, 15725), (17, 4625), (25, 3145). (37, 2125). (85,925), (125, 629),
(185, 425).
To get the parent keys we reduce moOulo !1I(N) :

(5,605), (17, 1601), (25, 121), (37, 2125), (85, 925), (125, 629),
(185, 425).
and the product of each pair equals 1 modulo j2S(N).
•

Next, we assign the group of A-clearance users the key K<JA = 125, the
B-clearance users key Kd.
Here note that

=25 , and the C-clearance users key Kdc =5.

Kdc I K<JA ' Kdc I Kda , and Kd. I K<JA .

An A-clearance user can decrypt any data encrypted using one of the
following Ke:

629 or «const. !1I(N» + 629) for const > 0
121 or « const. 1<l(N) + 121) for const > 0
605 or «const. !1I(N»+ 605) for const > 0
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while a B-clearance user user can decrypt any data encrypted using one of the
following Ke :
121 or (( const. !1I(N)) + 121) for const > 0
605 or ((canst. !1I(N» + 605) for const > 0

and a C-clearance user can only decrypt any data encrypted using Ke:
605 or ((const. !1I(N» + 605) for const > 0
•

Consider an A-clearance user with requesting access to a data item M encrypted as
M3145. To get the actual key used internally by the security system, it calculates

(l

Ke (mod !1I(N» " 125.3145 " 5 (mod !1I(N» .

= J<,jA.

This can be done because the system holds all parent keys securely. It then
calculates:
Kactual

= J<,jA 1(l
=

12515 = 25

and uses Kactual to perform decryption ofM3145, and thus

•

Note that if a B-clearance user with parent decryption key I<da = 25 tries to read
A-level data M629:

(l

= J<,jB.

Ke (mod !1I(N» ,,25 . 629 " 605 (mod !1I(N»

and
Kactual =

J<,jB 1 (l

25/605 < I
and hence the system will not decrypt the A-level data.
=

6. User decryption keys
Previously we found an encryption and decryption key for each security level.
We can simply issue these decryption keys to all users of a security level, hence all users
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of a level will have exactly the same key. However, it is desirable for each user to have a
key which is different (or at least looks different) from the other user keys. In this section
we present two ways to generate user keys from one parent key. We call keys which are
generated from the parent keys child or children keys. These are the keys issued to the
users.

6.1 User key generation based on mUltiplication by another parent key
First we choose a subsidiary parent key (dx, d".x+l) such that for a given parent
key (K" Kd) taken from the previous three parent keys all the products:

does not equal one modulo ¢(N). Next we issue children keys Kd* derived from parent
decrypting key Kd in the following way:
Kd'

= (( {;. (l(N)) + Kd). dn_x+I
= ({;. (l(N) . dn-x+I) + (Kd· dn-x+I)

(9)

where 8 is any positive integer greater than zero. Thus we can see from (9) that the
following is true for data element M:
(MK,)dxKd' "

(MK,.dx)Kd.dn_x+I "
(MI)I _ M (rrwdN)

(MK,Kd)dx-dn_x+I "

(10)

and hence what we have given the user is a child key derived not from one parent key. but
from two parent keys. Two or more users can try to find r/J(N) by reducing their keys
modulo some integer i until a common number f3 = ( Kd . dn-x+l) is found. Hence ¢(N)
equals i . But note that j3 is not a parent key belonging to any of the three security levels.
As before the security system must keep the subsidiary parent keys (dx , d n -x +l) secret.
On receiving a key Kd* from the user the system calculates:
( Kd' . dx )

"
-

II Kd. dn-x+I ) . dx )
(Kd. 1)" Kd (rrwd (l(N))

and use Kd to determine the user security clearance and to decrypt the requested data as in
the example before. The immediate problem here is that the method relies on the dificulty
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of factoring f3 and hence insecure. Since both Kd and d n.x+l are not necessarily prime,
factoring {J is not as difficult as the Factorization problem [RISH78].

6.2 Generation of user keys based on exponentiation of parent keys
The second way we propose to generate user keys is to use cenain powers of the
parent encryption and decryption keys. It is desirable for a given parent encryption key
Ke and a parent decryption key Kd to find integers X and Y such that the equation
K"x .K,?

= 1 I mod

Kef. K,r

=1 I mod ¢IN))

or

¢IN))

(11)

are true. To find such X and Y we must proceed with the following calculations:
from (3)

Ke . Kd

thus

Kd

and hence

K,r

=1 I mod ¢IN) )

= K,] I mod

¢IN))

= IK,] yc =K,X

I mod

¢IN)).

Solving equation (11) we have:

and thus
Ke f - X

=1

I mod

¢(N))

(12)

must be true.
Using Euler's theorem in equation (4) we get:
Ke¢(¢(N))

=1 I mod ¢IN))
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(where gcdlKe, ¢(N)) = 1 )

which means
Y-

x = ¢(¢(NJJ.

(13)

Note That in equation (11) we can interchange the use of X and Y and still
produce the same results. An example is shown below.

Example:
For N = 10062. 1l(N) = 3024 and 11!(11!(N» = 11!(3024) = 864 .
We take l<d = 125 and Ke = 629. and take X = 65 and Y = 929.

Now,

l<dX . KeY
,. 12565. 629929
-

,.

2141 . 1637

125929. 62965
2141 . 1637

,. 1

-

1

(mod 1l(N»

As before, an A-clearance user with l<d- = 2141 requests access to a data
item M encrypted as M3145. On receiving the user's key, the security
system checks:

l<d•. KeY (mod 1l(N»" 1
and fmds that the user is an A-clearance user. Thus l<dA = 125. To get the
actual key used internally by the security system. it calculates a as before
and then finds Kactual to perform decryption of the required data.

Here Kcr and KeY children keys of Kd and Ke respectively. From this we see
that we can give K;< or KdYas the user child decryption key, and encrypt all data
elements using just Ke. An advantage of using power X or Y of Kd is that we can
choose a unique X for each user, creating a form of user identification. On receiving a
user key K~ the security system checks the user security level by solving equation (11)
using a pre-stored KeY. If the user request data M to be returned in clear form, the
system simply decrypts cryptogram C = MKe using the secret parent decrypting key Kd
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as in equation (I) and (2). If the user requests data M to be returned in an encrypted

fonnat the system returns cryptogram C' to the user where:
(rrwdN)

and the user decrypts C' as:
(rrwd N ).

Note that a user knowing Kd* = Kcl or Kd* = K,r cannot decrypt data element M stored
as MKe because Kcl . Ke .. 1 mod ¢(N) and similarly KdY . Ke .. 1 mod ¢(N).

Compared with the fIrst method the second method provides the most secure way
of generating unique user decryption keys. There are a number of points which must be
taken into consideration when we use this solution. First of all, the number of possible
values of X for K,r is bounded by V¢(N)(Kd) where vm(a) denotes the order of a
modulo m. This is because Kd generates only a subset of the reduced set of residues

modulo ¢(N), and since we do not require ¢(N) to be prime it is clear that Kd cannot be a
primitive root modulo ¢(N). It is of course necesary that Kd and ¢(N) be coprime.

Given a key K,r and (J(N) the maximum number of user keys that caD be generated
equals V¢(N)!Kd). Furthermore, out these keys only a total of V¢(N)!Kd) - 4 can be
useful. This is because
X=A+ 1
X= A-I

gives Kcl '" Kd (mod ¢(N)),
gives Kcl '" Ke (mod ¢(N)),

X= A
X=A+1rI2

gives Kcl '" 1 (rrwd ¢(N)), and
gives Kcl (mod ¢(N) = KeY (mod ¢(N)

(where!t = V¢(NjKd) and ,1,= (constant. V¢(N)!Kd!) )

which does not give the desirable security. In addition, out of the remaining keys, there
are only (V¢(NlKd) - 4)/2 keys which are safe. This is because half of the remaining
keys are in fact the inverse of the other remaining half. This is shown in the following:
KIA + i). KIA + !t- i) '" 1 (mod ¢(N))

and thus to ensure security we only choose X

II

=

(for i = 1" .. , 1rI2 -1 )

A. + i ,for i = 2, ... , 1CI2 - 1.

(14)

7. A variation of the proposed scheme
There is a very interesting variation of the proposed scheme. It is based on the
fact that given a panieular piN) there are more than one N which produces that piN).
That is, there is a one-to-many mapping between piN) and N. Recall that equation (4)
requires that gcd(M, N) = 1 for any data M. It is clear that if N is prime equation (4) will
hold true regardless of M, and that given a non-prime N it is desirable to choose N such
that it consists of only a small number of prime factors. Thus using (4) we can assign a
different N to each of the security classification levels in the database and perfonn all
calculations in each level over a different modulo N. For example we can assign N 1 to the
A-level, N2 to the B-level and N3 to the C-level. and hence all encryption and decryption
of A-level data will be performed over modulo N]. B-Ievel data over modulo NZ, and Clevel data over modulo N3. As before N1, NZ and N3 are kept secret in the security
system. In our example before we had that N = 10062 and piN) = 3024, but in actual
fact there more than one N value for a given ¢(NJ. Some of the other N values for this
piN) are: 10584,10668,10836 and 10962. Note that a differentN used in each security

level will not affect the number of user keys available in that level. In fact, reencryption
of all data in a particular security level using a new N can be perfonned without having to
generate new user keys for all user of that clearance level.

8. Security of the scheme for databases
The above encryption and decryption scheme presents a very attractive method to
secure data stored in untrusted databases. The unit of encryption can either be whole
records, fields or individual data elements in a record. Denning has suggested that field
encryption may present advantages over record encryption in terms of the amount of
computation required to perfonn database operations such as projections and selections
(DENN83]. Our scheme assumes an encryption of individual data elements together with
record and field identifiers, however it can be extended to encryption of records and
fields. We also assume that the identifiers are kept in clear form for database operations
purposes.
Unlike the RSA cryptosystem, in which N, cryptogram C and encrypting key Ke
are made public, the proposed scheme only allows the children keys Kd' ; K,r and
cryptogram C public. The scheme assumes C to be public because it assumes that the
database system is an untrusted one with "back-doors" to the stored data.

GiVt'11 Ih.lt

N,

¢(N), p(p(N)), Ke, Kd, X and Yare all secret, and given that each user has a different
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key generated using a different X in Ktf, the malicious user or the attacker is faced with
a problem more difficult than Discrete Logarithm problem. This is because in the RSA
system N is public, whereas in this scheme N is secret. Without knowing N the attacker
cannot even attempt to solve the Discrete Logarithm problem. If two or more malicious
users worked together, their decryption keys cannot be reduced modulo some integer i to
a common number j3 because each of the keys are already reduced modulo ¢(N). Not
knowing ¢(N) and X the attacker cannot find Kd from Kd' ~ K,r .

9. Remarks
In the above scheme we have taken the approach of giving as little as possible
cryptographic information to the user. All the user knows is that he or she has a
(decrypting) key.
Another advantage of the proposed scheme is that at any time we can re-encrypt
the whole database using a different modulo N. Although it may require a large amount
of computation reencryption will thwart the efforts of a penetrator or trojan horse in
performing ciphenext searching of the database. The reencryption can be done on a copy
of the database in the background, and brought foward when all entries are reencrypted.
Otherwise, the secure system can keep track of the old and new N values and anytime a
data element is accessed it is decrypted over the old N and encrypted over the new N
value. This way the database is convened in a slow manner. This is because there are
different values N with the same ¢(N).
The proposed scheme presents a method to secure distributed database systems.
In a distributed database system a number of autonomous database systems at remote sites
cooperate and are linked up via computer networks. Using the proposed scheme we can
assign a different N to each site and perfonn all encryption and decryption of data at a site
based on modulo of theN at that site.
Most distributed database systems use system-wide naming for objects in the
system, including user names or identification. In this manner a user is recognized at
every site. Thus depending on how each site organizes it parent and children keys a
particular user can be designated as having A-clearance at one site and B-clearance at
another. In this manner the clearance of a user depends on the site which the user wants
to access, hence preserving autonomy of that site. Note that we can either have a user
using one key for all sites or one key for each site.
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10. Summary
A scheme for multilevel encryption with a variation has been proposed which

allows users with higher security clearance to read data of lower security classification,
and which allows users with lower security clearance to store data with higher security
classification. The scheme is based on the Discrete Logarithm problem to provide its

security and uses the same encryption and decryption method as the RSA cryptosystern.
The system holds parent keys which are used to generate children keys. All
cryptographic information with the exception of the user keys is held securely internally in

the security system and the system has the ability to deny access to the database. The
scheme present some ways to encrypt data in a distributed database system and while still
retaining its multilevel property.
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